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Article 9

ARTICLES
Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation"
John M. Finnis*
I.

During the past thirty years there has emerged in Europe a
standard form of legal regulation of sexual conduct. This standard
form or scheme, which I shall call the "standard modem [European] position," is accepted by the European Court of Human
Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights (the two
supra-national judicial and quasijudicial institutions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), to which almost all European states are
party, whether or not they are also party to the European [Economic] Community now known as the European Union). The
standard modem European position has two limbs. On the one
hand, the state is not authorized to, and does not, make it a punishable offence for adult consenting persons to engage, in private,
in immoral sexual acts (for example, homosexual acts). On the
other hand, states do have the authority to discourage, say, homosexual conduct and "orientation" (i.e. overtly manifested active
willingness to engage in homosexual conduct). And typically,
though not universally, they do so. That is to say, they maintain
various criminal and administrative laws and policies which have as
part of their purpose the discouraging of such conduct. Many of
these laws, regulations, and policies discriminate (i.e. distinguish)
between heterosexual and homosexual conduct adversely to the
latter.
In
England, for
example,
well
after Parliament's
decriminalization of private adult homosexual conduct by the
Sexual Offences Act 1967, the highest court (the House of Lords)
reaffirmed that a jury may lawfully convict on a charge of conspir-
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ing to corrupt public morals by publishing advertisements by private individuals of their availability for (non-commercial) private
homosexual acts.' The Court of Appeal has constantly reaffirmed,
notably in 1977, 1981 and 1990,2 that public soliciting of adult
males by adult males falls within the statutory prohibition of
"importun[ing] in a public place for an immoral purpose."' Parliament has peacefully accepted both these judicial interpretations
of the constitutional, statutory and common law position. It has
also voted more than once to maintain the legal position whereby
the age of consent for lawful intercourse is 21 for homosexual but
16 for heterosexual intercourse;4 in February 1994 the House of
Commons voted to make the homosexual age of consent 18,
which would reduce but retain the differentiation between homosexual and heterosexual conduct.5 In 1988, Parliament specifically
prohibited local governments in England from doing anything to
"intentionally promote homosexuality" or "promote the teaching in
any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a
pretended family relationship."' The provisions of English law
relating to marriage and to adoption similarly manifest a purpose
or at least a willingness to discourage homosexual conduct and
impede its promotion by any form of invitatory activity other than
between consenting adults and in a truly private milieu.
The English position as outlined above is in full conformity
with the position upheld by the European human rights institutions. When the European Court of Human Rights in 1981 adopted (and in 1988 reaffirmed) the position which Parliament in

1 Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. v. Director of Pub.
Prosecutions, [1973] A.C. 435 (1972).
2 Regina v. Goddard, 92 Grim. App. R. 185 (1990); Regina v. Gray 74 0rim. App.
K 324 (1981); Regina v. Ford, 66 Grim. App. R. 46 (1977).
3 Sexual Offences Act 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 69, § 32 (Eng.).
4 Id. § 6(1) (heterosexual acts: age of consent 16); Sexual Offences Act, 1967, ch.
60, § 1(1) (Eng.) (homosexual acts: age of consent 21).
5 The bill has yet to be passed by the House of Lords.
6 The statute states:
2A(1) A local authority shall not(a) intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention
of promoting homosexuality;,
(b) promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship.
Local Government Act 1986, ch. 10, § 2A (Eng.), inserted by Local Government Act 1988,
ch. 9, § 28 (Eng.).
A "maintained school" is any school funded by a local governmental authority and
includes most of the schools in England.
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England had taken in 1967, it ruled that penal prohibition of
private adult homosexual activity is not necessary for the securing
of the state's legitimate aim of protecting morals.7 In doing so,
the court expressly left unscathed, and in principle confirmed, the
decision of March 13, 1980 of the European Commission of Human Rights (and of the Commission on October 12, 1978 and the
Council of Ministers by Resolution DH (79) 5 of June 12, 1979)
that states can properly prohibit private consensual homosexual
acts involving a male under 21 notwithstanding the Convention
right of non-discrimination in the legal protection of rights and
notwithstanding that the state law in question made 16 the "age of
consent" for heterosexual intercourse (and 18 the age of majority
for other purposes).
The Commission has subsequently reaffirmed that decision
and has declared unarguable ("inadmissible" for further judicial
process)
complaints
made,
under
the
Convention's
anti-discrimination provisions, against the long-standing Swiss law
which criminalizes homosexual prostitution (male or female) but
not heterosexual prostitution.'
II.
The standard modem [European] position is consistent with
the view that (apart perhaps from special cases and contexts) it is
unjust for A to impose any kind of disadvantage on B simply because A believes (perhaps correctly) that B has sexual inclinations
(which he may or may not act on) towards persons of the same
sex. (Special cases are more likely to arise, for example, where B's
inclination is towards "man-boy love," i.e. pederasty.) The position
does not give B the widest conceivable legal protection against
such unjust discrimination (just as it generally does not give wide
protection against needless acts of adverse private discrimination
in housing or employment to people with unpopular or eccentric
political views). But the position does not itself encourage, sponsor
or impose any such unjust burden. (And it is accompanied by
many legal protections for homosexual persons with respect to

7 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 (ser.A) (1981); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.L 20 (serA) (1988).
8 Application 11680/85, decision of March 10, 1988, unpublished; see MIREILLE
DELMAS-MARTY,

THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION

FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 252-54 (1992).

RIGHTS:
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assaults, threats, unreasonable discrimination by public bodies and
officials, etc.)
The concern of the standard modem position itself is not
with inclinations but entirely with certain decisions to express or
manifest deliberate promotion of, or readiness to engage in, homosexual activity or conduct, including promotion of forms of life (e.g.
purportedly marital cohabitation) which both encourage such
activity and present it as a valid or acceptable alternative to the
committed heterosexual union which the state recognizes as marriage. Subject only to the written or unwritten constitutional requirement of freedom of discussion of ideas, the state laws and
state policies whic h I have outlined are intended to discourage
decisions which are thus deliberately oriented towards homosexual
conduct and are manifested in public ways.
The standard modern position differs from the position which
it replaced, which made adult consensual sodomy and like acts
crimes per se. States which adhere to the standard modem position make it clear by laws and policies such as I have referred to
that the state has by no means renounced its legitimate concern
with public morality and the education of children and young
people towards truly worthwhile and against alluring but bad
forms of conduct and life. Nor have such states renounced the
judgment that a life involving homosexual conduct is bad even for
anyone unfortunate enough to have innate or quasi-innate homosexual inclinations.
The difference between the standard modem position and the
position it has replaced can be expressed as follows. The standard
modem position considers that the state's proper responsibility for
upholding true worth (morality) is a responsibility subsidiary (auxiliary) to the primary responsibility of parents and non-political voluntary associations. The subsidiary character of government is
widely emphasized and increasingly accepted, at least in principle,
in contemporary European politics. (It was, for example, a comerstone of the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992.) This conception of the
proper role of government has been taken to exclude the state
from assuming a directly parental disciplinary role in relation to
consenting adults. That role was one which political theory and
practice formerly ascribed to the state on the assumption that the
role followed by logical necessity from the truth that the state
should encourage true worth and discourage immorality. That
assumption is now judged to be mistaken (a judgment for which I
shall argue in the final part of this lecture).
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So the modem theory and practice draws a distinction not
drawn in the former legal arrangements-a distinction between
(a) supervising the truly private conduct of adults and (b) supervising the public realm or environment. The importance of the latter
includes the following considerations: (1) this is the environment
or public realm in which young people (of whatever sexual inclination) are educated; (2) it is the context in which and by which
everyone with responsibility for the well being of young people is
helped or hindered in assisting them to avoid bad forms of life;
(3) it is the milieu in which and by which all citizens are encouraged and helped, or discouraged and undermined, in their own
resistance to being lured by temptation into falling away from
their own aspirations to be people of integrated good character,
and to be autonomous, self-controlled persons rather than slaves
to impulse and sensual gratification.
While the type (a) supervision of truly private adult consensual conduct is now considered to be Outside the state's normally
proper role (with exceptions such as sado-masochistic bodily damage, and assistance in suicide), type (b) supervision of the
moral-cultural-educational environment is maintained as a very
important part of the state's justification for claiming legitimately
the loyalty of its decent citizens.
III.

The standard modem position is part of a politico-legal order
which systematically outlaws many forms of discrimination. Thus
the European Convention on Human Rights (model for several
dozen constitutions enacted over the past thirty-five years by the
British authorities, for nations gaining independence) provides
that the protection of the rights it sets out is to be enjoyed without discrimination on any ground such as "sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other
status."
But the standard modem position deliberately rejects proposals to include in such lists the item, "sexual orientation." The explanation commonly given (correctly, in my opinion) is this. The
phrase "sexual orientation" is radically equivocal. Particularly as
used by promoters of "gay rights," the phrase ambiguously assimilates two things which the standard modem position carefully
distinguishes: (I) a psychological or psychosomatic disposition
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inwardly orienting one towards homosexual activity; (II) the deliberate decision so to orient one's public behavior as to express or
manifest one's active interest in and endorsement of homosexual
conduct and/or forms of life which presumptively involve such
conduct.
It is also widely observed that laws or proposed laws outlawing
"discrimination based on sexual orientation" are always interpreted
by "gay rights" movements as going far beyond discrimination
based merely on A's belief that B is sexually attracted to persons
of the same sex. Instead (it is observed), "gay rights" movements
interpret the phrase as extending full legal protection to public
activities intended specifically to promote, procure and facilitate
homosexual conduct.
It has been noticed in public circles in Europe that such laws
have indeed been interpreted by American courts as having just
such an implication. An example which has been widely reported
is the Georgetown University case,9 requiring a religiously affiliated educational institution to give equal access to its facilities to
organizations "participating in and promoting homosexual lifestyles
[which necessarily include homosexual conduct]" in manifest opposition to the moral beliefs and teachings of the. religion with
which that institution professed an association.
So, while the standard position accepts that acts of type (I)
discrimination are unjust, it judges that there are compelling reasons both to deny that such injustice would be appropriately remedied by laws against "discrimination based on sexual orientation,"
and to hold that such a "remedy" would work significant discrimination and injustice against (and would indeed damage) families,
associations and institutions which have organized themselves to
live out and transmit ideals of family life that include a high conception of the worth of truly conjugal sexual intercourse.
It is in fact accepted by almost everyone, on both sides of the
political debate, that the adoption of a law framed to prohibit
"discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation" would require
the prompt abandonment of all attempts by the political community to discourage homosexual conduct by means of educational
policies, restrictions on prostitution, 'non-recognition of homosexual "marriages" and adoptions, and so forth. It is judged (and in
my view soundly) that the law itself would perforce have changed

9 Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536
A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
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from teaching, in many ways, that homosexual conduct is bad to
teaching, massively, that it is a type of sexual activity as good as
any other (and per se much less involved with onerous responsibilities than is the sexual union of husband and wife or, in perhaps other ways, the life of those who live in unmarried chastity).

IV.
The standard modern position involves a number of explicit
or implicit judgments about the proper role of law and the compelling interests of political communities, and about the evil of
homosexual conduct. Can these be defended by reflective, critical,
publicly intelligible and -rational arguments? I believe they can.
Since even the advocates of "gay rights" do not seriously assert
that the state can never have any compelling interests in public
morality or the moral formation of its young people or the moral
environment in which parents, other educators, and young people
themselves must undertake this formation, I shall in this lecture
focus rather on the underlying issue which receives far too little
public discussion: What is wrong with homosexual conduct? Is the
judgment that it is morally wrong inevitably a manifestation either
of mere hostility to a hated minority, or of purely religious, theological, and sectarian belief which can ground no constitutionally.
valid determination disadvantaging those who do not conform to
it?
I have been using and shall continue to use the terms "homosexual activity," "homosexual acts" and "homosexual conduct"
synonymously, to refer to bodily acts, on the body of a person of
the same sex, which are engaged in with a view to securing orgasmic sexual satisfaction for one or more of the parties.
Let me begin by noticing a too little noticed fact. All three of
the greatest Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle,
regarded homosexual conduct as intrinsically shameful, immoral,
and indeed depraved or depraving. That is to say, all three rejected the linchpin of modem "gay" ideology and lifestyle.
Socrates is portrayed by Plato (and by Xenophon) as having
strong homosexual (as well as heterosexual) inclinations or interest, and as promoting an ideal of homosexual romance between
men and youths, but at the same time as utterly rejecting homosexual conduct. This is made clear in Sir Kenneth Dover's book
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Greek Homosexuality; ° in Dover's summarizing, words: "Xenophon's
Socrates lacks the sensibility and urbanity of the Platonic Socrates,
but there is no doubt that both of them condemn homosexual
copulation.""1 It is also made clear by Gregory Vlastos in his last
book, precisely on Socrates: In Socratic eros involving relationships
of affection between men and boys or youths, intimacy is limited
to mind- and eye-contact and "terminal gratification" is forbidden 2 (and a fortiori in relationships between adult males, since
virtually all Athenians regarded sex acts between adult males as
intrinsically shameful)." Vlastos thus makes it clear that Socrates
forbids precisely what I have been calling homosexual conduct.
In the recent Amendment 2 case in Colorado, Evans v.
Romer,4 the widely influential classical philosopher Professor Martha Nussbaum gave oral and written evidence on these matters, as
expert witness for plaintiffs who seek to overturn a provision of
the Colorado Constitution which provides that no official body in
Colorado may adopt any law or policy "whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of ... a claim to minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination." In her oral testimony (on October 15, 1993), she flatly denied that Dover's book Greek Homosexuality came to the conclusion
that Socrates condemned homosexual copulation. Dover concluded
only, she said, that Socrates condemned the seduction of students.
A few days later, the Princeton legal and political-theoretical scholar Professor Robert George gave evidence to show that Dover's
book unequivocally concludes that Socrates, as portrayed by our
two sources Plato and Xenophon, condemned homosexual copulation as such, and did not confine the prohibition to any particular
relationships. Professor Nussbaum promptly wrote 5 to George
asserting that that was false testimony given in reckless disregard
of the truth. Demanding peremptorily that George retract before
the close of the trial on October 22, 1993, she claimed that Dover
himself would personally support her reading of his conclusion

10

KENNETH J. DOVER, GREEK HOMOSExUALrnry 154-59 (1978).

11

Id. at 159.

12

GREGORY VLASTOS, SoCRATEs, IRONIST AND MORAL PHILOSOPHER 38-39 (1991).

13
'Athens,
14
15
versity

Clifford Hindley & David Cohen, Debate: Law, Society, and Homosexuality in Classical
133 PAST & PRESENT 167, 179-89, 188 n.14 (1991).
No. 92CV7223 (D. Den., filed Nov. 12, 1992).
Letter from Martha Nussbaum, Professor of Philosophy and Classics, Brown Uni(Oct. 20, 1993). The letter was faxed on October 21, 1993.
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about Socrates. In the event, Dover wrote to me on January 23,
1994, and authorizes me to quote him:
It is certainly my opinion that the Socrates of Plato and
Xenophon condemned homosexual copulation as such, and did
not confine the prohibition to any particular relationships. I
certainly meant to say that on pp. 159f. of my book.'
What, then, about Plato? Well, the same Plato who in his
Symposium wrote a famous celebration of romantic and spiritual
man-boy erotic relationships, made very clear that all forms of
sexual conduct outside heterosexual marriage are shameful, wrongful and harmful. This is particularly evident from his treatment of
the matter in his last work, the Laws, but is also sufficiently clear
in the Republic and the Phaedrus, and even in the Symposium itself.
This is affirmed unequivocally both by Dover and by Vlastos, neither of whom has any favor for these views of Plato. According to
Vlastos, for example, Plato:
saw anal intercourse as 'contrary to nature,' [footnote:
Ph[ae]dr[us] 251A1, L[aws] 636-7] a degradation not only of
man's humanity, but even of his animality ....
It is for Plato, Vlastos adds, a type of act far more serious than
any mere going "contrary to the rules." 8

16 Letter from Kenneth J. Dover (Jan. 23, 1994) (on file with author).
17 GREGORY VLASTOS, PLATONIC STUDIES 25 (2d ed. 1981). In the footnote, Vlastos
complains that by para phusin, "contrary to nature", Plato here and in 836B-C meant
something "far stronger" than the phrase "against the rules", which Dover had used in a
1966 article on eros and nomos.. Sometime before the revised edition, Vlastos and Dover
corresponded about this complaint, and Vlastos records a letter from Dover:
What [Plato] did believe was that the act was "unnatural", in the sense "against
the rules"; it was a morally ignorant exploitation of pleasure beyond what was
"granted" (kata phusin apodedosthai, [Laws] 636C4), the product of an akrateia,
([636]C6), which can be aggravated by habituation and bad example. His comparison of homosexuality with incest ([Laws] 837E8-838E1) is particularly revealing.
Id. at 424. And Vlastos immediately remarks that Dover's allusion to Plato's comparison
of homosexuality with incest shows that Dover' acknowledges the great force with which
Plato is condemning what Vlastos called "anal intercourse" and Dover, loosely, "the act"
and "homosexuality". Id. at 25, 424.
18 Id. at 25. 1 want to add, out of respect for Plato, that Anthony Price's valuable
book firmly rejects Vlastos' theory that Socrates and Plato, though forbidding homosexual
acts, accepted that lovers could nevertheless rightly engage in the sort of petting spoken
of in Phaedrus 255e. ANTHONY W. PRICE, LOvE AND FRIENDSHIP IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE
89-94 (1989).
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On Plato, Martha Nussbaum's oral evidence took a
remarkable course. She claimed that the translation of Laws 63619
which had been quoted to the court in my affidavit was inaccurate; instead of the phrase "those guilty of such enormities," it
should have read, in morally neutral terms, "those who first ventured to do these things." Therefore, none of the translations of
or references to Plato in my affidavit could be relied upon, and
Plato in fact approved of homosexual conduct. Robert George
then gave evidence that ill the existing English translations, without exception, translate the relevant Greek phrase with some pejorative term, or use a pejorative term about the same conduct at
an equivalent point in the previous sentence; and that in particular the philologist Sir Kenneth Dover translates the relevant Greek
word, tolmema, as "crime" (meaning moral crime). So in her affidavit, delivered on the last day of the trial, Professor Nussbaum
stated that Liddell & Scott, "the authoritative Greek dictionary
relied on by all scholars in this area," translates tolmema with only
the favorable or neutral terms "an adventure, enterprise, deed of
daring."" In fact, however, Liddell & Scott translates it "adventure, enterprise, daring or shameless act."2 What Nussbaum had
done was quote from the 1897 edition of the dictionary, an edition entirely superseded in 1940, doing so without disclosing to
the court the date or edition. In short, she put a dictionary before
the court precisely as "the authoritative dictionary relied on by all
scholars in the area," but the quotation which she said was from
that 'dictionary was in fact from a dictionary which is not authoritative or relied upon by any scholars. And she did so because to
have quoted from the real "authoritative dictionary" would have
destroyed the fundamental contention of her oral evidence about
Plato, while to have allowed the court to know the truth about the
long-superseded nineteenth century source of her lexicography
would have deprived her testimony of the appearance of authoritative support which it so badly needed to offset the devastating
counter-witness of Dover.

19 "When male unites with female for procreation the pleasure experienced is held
to be natural, but unnatural when male mates with male or female with female, and
those first guilty of these enormities were impelled by their weakness for pleasure." PLATO, LAWS I, 636C, at 41 (R.G. Bury trans., 1926).
20 Affidavit of Martha C. Nussbaum, at 1 10, Evans v. Romer, No. 92CV7223
(D.Den., filed Nov. 12, 1992) (Oct. 21, 1993) (served Oct. 22, 1993).
21

LIDDELL & ScoTr,

A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 1803

Roderick McKenzie eds., 9th ed. 1940, Supp. 1968) (1992)

(Sir Henry Stuart Jones &
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In her oral testimony, she flatly denied that Dover's study of
Plato concludes that Plato condemned all homosexual 'copulation.
No, she said, Dover concluded only- that Plato condemned sex
involving bribery or prostitution. Once again, Dover, having been
put on notice of that contention, permits me to quote his letter of
January 23, 1994: "Plato condemns all homosexual copulation (pp.
165-8 in my book). " 's
A key element in Plato's condemnation of homosexual
conduct is his repeated judgment, in the Phaedrus and the Laws,
that it is para phusin, contrary to nature. On this matter, Professor
Nussbaum's testimony was clear:
the terms tendentiously translated "according to nature" and'
"unnatural" or "contrary to nature" actually refer (in my own
expert opinion and the consensus of recent scholars such as
Price, whose study of the passage [in the Laws] has been widely accepted) to "birth" and not "nature" in any normative moral sense.s
This claim about a consensus of recent scholars rejecting as tendentious the translation "unnatural" or "contrary to nature," or
supporting Nussbaum's outlandish translation of para phusin, was
pure fabrication. According to Nu~sbaum herself, the "modem
consensus" on the matter formed itself around Price's "widely
accepted" study. Very well. But what Nussbaum says about Price's
study of the passage is, shockingly, the exact reverse of the truth.
That study unhesitatingly translates para phusin, in Laws 636 and
841, as "unnatural". For example, its translation of 636c is: "homo-

22 Dover, supra note 16.
23 Nussbaum, supra note 20, at 1 54. This "consensus of recent scholars such as
Price" becomes in the opening sentence of the following paragraph "the modem consensus". An earlier reference makes it clear that the reference to Price's "widely accepted"
study of the passage is to his book, LOvE AND FRIENDSHIP IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE, supra
note 18. The book was reviewed by Professor Nussbaum in the Times Literary Supplement
in February, 1990. Throughout her discussion of the Laws in 1 51-55, Nussbaum refers
to "the passage," without ever identifying it or attending to the fact that in my affidavit
dated October 8, 1993, I had cited four passages, and had quoted two widely separated
passages each of which applies to homosexual acts the phrase on which she is commenting in
54, para phusin. The only passage she has explicitly cited to the court is the
Laws 636 passage in book I, but some confused remarks in
52, and the drift of
54,
suggest that she may have had Laws VIII, 841 uppermost in her mind in 1 54. It should
not be overlooked that the discordance between homosexual acts and phusis is plainly
asserted by Plato's mouthpiece also in Laws VIII, 836 & 838.
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sexual intercourse, between males or females, seems to be an
unnatural [para phusin] crime [tolmema] of the first rank."24
Let me summarize how Professor Nussbaum treated Price's
"widely accepted" study. Price's book translates these uses of para
phusin as "unnatural," and yet her statements under oath unambiguously imply that it rejects that translation as tendentious. The
conclusions of the book's long appendix on "Plato's Sexual Morality" are squarely based on Price's reasoned judgment that "unnatural" in these passages both conveyed and entailed Plato's essential
moral judgments on sexual conduct, yet Nussbaum swears that it
supports her denial that the term had "any normative moral
sense" and her assertion that it signified for Plato no more than
inconsistency with a temporary pro-natalist colonial politics.
Nussbaum implicitly claims the support of Price's book for her
fundamental contention that the sexual morality put to the court
by Robert George and by me is purely theological, Catholic and
-indeed narrowly Thomist in origin, and "simply has no precedent
in the ancient Greek secular exemplars of natural law argumentation " ' including Plato"; yet Price's book in fact argues, prominently and very explicitly, that Plato's main positions on the morality of sexual conduct, evidenced by the Republic and the
Phaedrus as well as by the Laws, were (rather to Price's regret)
substantially the same as the positions maintained in the Catholic
tradition's understanding of natural law.2
The fabrication of the imaginary "modem consensus" about
para phusin also required Professor Nussbaum to withhold from
the court the fact that the other scholarly authorities most prominently and frequently appealed to in her testimony-Dover, Price,
Vlastos, Winkler-all concur in using the terms "unnatural" or
"contrary to nature" to translate para phusin as predicated of homosexual acts in Laws.2" All treat this translation as entirely
uncontroversial. All judge that para phusin, as used by Plato in the
Laws, must be understood as the core of a very firm and unqualified condemnation of homosexual conduct. All explicitly or implicitly reject out of hand Nussbaum's. assertion that "the passage" in

24 PRICE, supra note 18, at 230.
25 Nussbaum, supra note 20, at 1 14.
26 Id. at
67.
27 PRICE, supra note 18, at 229-235 (note the references to Paul VI and John Paul
II, at 233, 235).
28 DOVER, supra note 10, at 165-68; VLASTOS, supra note 17, at 25, 425; JOHN J.
WINKLER, THE CONSTRAINTS OF DESIRE 18, 21n. (1990).
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the Laws "says nothing at all about sexual acts among non-married
people." Like even Halperin and Winkler (the openly "gay" scholars also appealed to in Nussbaum's affidavit), Dover, Price, and (as
we shall see) Vlastos all judge that to know or tell Plato's views on
the morality, the immorality, of all such non-marital conduct as
homosexual sex acts, one need go no further than these unmistakably clear passages in the Laws, texts with which every other text
of Plato can readily be seen to be consistent.'
As for Aristotle, Dover's discussion is less satisfactory; it neglects a number of relevant passages. Still, it does not contradict
the scholarly consensus that Aristotle rejected homosexual conduct. In fact, such conduct is frequently represented by Aristotle
(in some cases directly and in other cases by a lecturer's hint) as
intrinsically perverse, shameful and harmful both to the individuals
involved and to society itself."0
On Aristotle, the manipulations in Nussbaum's affidavit were
as thoroughgoing as we should by now expect. She associated
Price's book with her affidavit's assertions that Aristotle approved
and endorsed homosexual acts. But in reality the Aristotle of
Price's book is "rather shocked" even by Plato's Republids carefully
and famously restricted suggestion that "the lover may kiss and
touch the beloved, with his consent, just like a son." "l The final
sentences of Price's reflections on Aristotle's view of erotic love
conclude that, for Aristotle, such love is properly either marital or
pederastic; on the same page Price reminds us that for Aristotle
pederasty is not only as transient as boyhood but also "should
keep to its higher forms, 'looking rather than loving' as Plato had
put it." 2 It is not to include homosexual sex acts. What do we
find Nussbaum saying? "I agree with Price's conclusion," she says,
proceeding to quote Price's final sentences, but slicing off, without
any indication, the first fourteen words so that in place of Price's
reference to marriage and "pederasty" (thus understood as excluding sex acts) she can substitute her own words "heterosexual and
homosexual relations" (understood as including sex acts between
males of any age). A similar falsifying and unsignalled truncation

29 See DAVID M. HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 91 (1990);
WINKLER, supra note 28, at 18, 21.
30 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VII, 5:1148b29; ARISTOTLE, POLITICS II,
1:1252a33-39, together with the hints in II, 6:1269b28 and II, 7:1272a25.
31 PRICE, supra note 18, at 224-25 (citing PLATO, REPUBLIC 403b4-6 and ARISTOTLE,
PoLrrcs, 1262a32-7).
32 Id. (quoting PLATO, LAWS VIII, 837C4-5).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:5

occurs in her affidavit's only quotation from Aristotle himself, and
all the other passages of Aristotle that she cites are manifestly
abused and misrepresented.
Although the ideology of homosexual love (with its accompanying devaluation of women) continued to have philosophical
defenders down to the end of classical Greek civilization, there
equally continued to be influential philosophical writers, wholly
untouched by Judaeo-Christian tradition, who taught that homosexual conduct is not only intrinsically shameful but also inconsistent with a proper recognition of the equality of women with men
in intrinsic worth. (The ancients did not fail to note that Socrates'
homoerotic orientation, for all its admirable chastity-abstention
from homosexual conduct-went along with a neglect to treat his
wife as an equal.) A good example of such late classical writing is
Plutarch's Erotikos,"3 written probably some time in the early second century, but .certainly free from Judaeo-Christian influence.
Plutarch's vast literary-historical and philosophical corpus of writings is an effort to recapture and recapitulate the highest
achievements of classical civilization, and had a very substantial
influence on Western thought down to recent times. I shall say
more about Plutarch's thought on these matters below.
Another example is the Stoic, Musonius Rufus (who taught at
Rome circa 80 A.D. and again was not influenced by Jewish or
Christian thought). He rejects all homosexual conduct as shameful. Sexual conduct is decent and acceptable only within marriage.
The point of marriage includes not only procreation and the raising of children, but also, integrally and essentially, a complete
community of life and mutual care and affection between husband
and wife.'
At the heart of the Platonic-Aristotelian and later ancient
philosophical rejections of all homosexual conduct, and thus of
the modern "gay" ideology, are three fundamental theses: (1) The
commitment of a man and woman to each other in the sexual
union of marriage is intrinsically good and reasonable, and is
incompatible with sexual relations outside marriage. (2) Homosexual acts are radically and peculiarly non-marital, and for that reason intrinsically unreasonable and unnatural. (3) Furthermore,
according to Plato, if not Aristotle, homosexual acts have a special
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PLUTARCH, EROTIKOS, Dialogue on Love, 751C-D, 766E-771D.

34 Musonius Rufus, Discourses XII and XIIIA, in Cora E. Lutz, Musonius Rufus "the
Roman Socrates," X YALE CLASSICAL STUDIES 85-89 (1947).
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similarity to solitary masturbation, and both types of radically
non-marital act are manifestly unworthy of the human being and
immoral.
V.
I want now to offer an interpretation of these three theses
which articulates them more clearly than was ever attempted by
Plato or, so far as we can tell, by Aristotle. It is, I think, an interpretation faithful to what they do say, but takes up suggestions in
Plutarch and in the eighteenth century Enlightenment philosophy
of Immanuel Kant (who likewise rejected all homosexual conduct),
though even these writers' indications, too, remain relatively terse.
My account also articulates thoughts which have historically been
implicit in the judgments of many non-philosophical people, and
which have been held to justify the laws adopted in many nations
and states both before and after the period when Christian beliefs
as such were politically and socially dominant. And it is an application of the theory of morality and natural law developed over the
past thirty years by Germain Grisez and others. A fuller exposition
can be found in the chapter on marriage, sexual acts, and family
life, in the new second volume of Grisez's great work on moral
theology."5
Plato's mature concern, in the Laws, for familiarity, affection
and love between spouses in a chastely exclusive marriage,
Aristotle's representation of marriage as an intrinsically desirable
friendship between quasi-equals, and as a state of life even more
natural to human beings than political life,"8 and Musonius
Rufus's conception of the inseparable double goods of marriage,
all find expression in Plutarch's celebration of marriage-as a
union not of mere instinct but of reasonable love, and not merely
for procreation but for mutual help, goodwill and cooperation for
their own sake. 7 Plutarch's severe critiques of homosexual con-

35 2 GERMAIN GRIsEz, THE WAY OF THE LORD JEsus, Living a Christian Life 555-574.
633-680 (1993).
36 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics, VIII,12: 1162a16-30; see also the probably pseudo-Aristotle, Oeconomica I, 3-4: 1343b12-1344a22; III.
37 Plutarch reads this conception back to the dawn of Athenian civilization and,
doubtless anachronistically, ascribes it to the great original Athenian law-giver, Solon:
Marriage should be "a union of life between man and woman for the delights of love
and the getting of children." PLUTARCH, LIFE OF SOLON 20, 4. See also PLUTARCH,
EROTIKOs 769:
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duct (and of the disparagement of women implicit in homosexual
ideology),3 8 develop Plato's critique of homosexual and all other
extra-marital sexual conduct. Like Musonius Rufus, Plutarch does
so by bringing much closer to explicit articulation the following
thought. Genital intercourse between spouses enables them to
actualize and experience (and in that sense express) their marriage itself, as a single reality with two blessings (children and
mutual affection)." Non-marital intercourse, especially but not
only homosexual, has no such point and therefore is unacceptable.
The core of this argument can be clarified by comparing it
with Saint Augustine's treatment of marriage in his De Bono
Coniugali. The good of marital communion. is here an instrumental good, in the service of the procreation and education of
children so that the intrinsic, non-instrumental good of friendship
will be promoted and realized by the propagation of the human
race, and the intrinsic good of inner integration be promoted and
realized by the "remedying" of the disordered desires of concupiscence.'4 Now, when considering sterile marriages, Augustine
had identified a further good of marriage, the natural societas
(companionship) of the two sexes.4 Had he truly integrated this
into his synthesis, he would have recognized that in sterile and
fertile marriages alike, the communion, companionship, societas
and amicitia of the spouses-their being married-is the very good
of marriage, and is an intrinsic, basic human good, not merely
instrumental to any other good. And this communion of married

In the case of lawful wives, physical union is the beginning of friendship, a
sharing, as it were, in great mysteries. [The] pleasure is short [or unimportant:
mnikron], but the respect and kindness and mutual affection and loyalty that daily
spring from it [conjugal sex] convicts neither the Delphians of raving when they
call Aphrodite 'Harmony' nor Homer when he designates such a union
'friendship'. It also proves that Solon was a very experienced legislator of marriage laws. He prescribed that a man should consort with his wife not less than
three times a month-not for the pleasure surely, but as cities renew their mutual agreements from time to time, just so he must have wished this to be a
renewal of marriage and with such an act of tenderness to wipe out the complaints that accumulate from everyday living.
38 See PLUTARCH, EROTIKoS 768D-770A; IX MoRALiA 427 (Loeb ed., 1961); see also
the fine translation in DA. RUSSELL, PLUTARCH 92 (1973).
39 Plutarch speaks of the union of husband and wife as an "integral amalgamation"
[di' holon krasis]. PLUTARCH, EROTIKOS 769F; CONIUGALIA PRAECEPTA 142F.

40
41

ST. AUGUSTINE, DE BONO CONIUGALI, 9.9.
Id. at 3.3.
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life, this integral amalgamation of the lives of the two persons (as
Plutarch4 2 put it before John Paul II),' s has as its intrinsic elements, as essential parts of one and the same good, the goods and
ends to which the theological tradition, following Augustine, for a
long time subordinated that communion. It took a long and gradual process of development of doctrine, through the Catechism of
the Council of Trent, the teachings of Pius XI and Pius XII, and
eventually those of Vatican II-a process brilliantly illuminated by
Germain Grisez--to bring the tradition to the position that procreation and children are neither the end (whether primary or
secondary) to which marriage is instrumental (as Augustine
taught), nor instrumental to the good of the spouses (as much
secular and "liberal Christian" thought supposes), but rather: Parenthood and children and family are the intrinsic fulfillment of a
communion which, because it is not merely instrumental, can exist
and fulfill the spouses even if procreation happens to be impossible for them.
Now if, as the recent encyclical on the foundations of morality, Veitatis Splendor, teaches, "the communion of persons in marriage" which is violated by every act of adultery is itself a "fundamental human good,"45 there fall into place not only the elements of the classic philosophical judgments on non-marital sexual
conduct but also the similar judgments reached about such conduct by decent people who cannot articulate explanatory premises
for those judgments, which they reach rather by an insight into
what is and is not consistent with realities whose goodness they
experience and understand at least sufficiently to will and choose.
In particular, there fall into place the elements of an answer to
the question: Why cannot non-marital friendship be promoted and
expressed by sexual acts? Why is the attempt to express affection
by orgasmic non-marital sex the pursuit of an illusion? Why did
Plato and Socrates, Xenophon, Aristotle, Musonius Rufus, and Plutarch, right at the heart of their reflections on the homoerotic
culture around them, make the very deliberate and careful judgment that homosexual conduct (and indeed all extra-marital sexual
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ed in
point
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PLUTARCH, EROTIKOs 769f; CONIUGALIA PRAECEPTA 142E
John Paul II, Address to Young Married Couples at Taranto (October 1989), quotGRISEZ, supra note 35, at 571 n.46 ("a great project: fusing your persons to the
of becoming 'one flesh'").
GRISEZ, supra note 35, at 556-569.
JOHN PAUL H, VERITATIS SPLENDOR 1 13, 48 (1984); see also id. at 1 50, 67, 78,
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gratification) is radically incapable of participating in, actualizing,
the common good of friendship?
Implicit in the philosophical and common-sense rejection of
extra-marital sex is the answer: The union of the reproductive organs of husband and wife really unites them biologically (and
their biological reality is part of, not merely an instrument of,
their personal reality); reproduction is one function and so, in
respect of that function, the spouses are indeed one reality, and
their sexual union therefore can actualize and allow them to experience their real common good-their marriage with the two goods, parenthood and friendship, which (leaving aside the order of grace)
are the parts of its wholeness as an intelligible common good even
if, independently of what the spouses will, their capacity for biological parenthood will not be fulfilled by that act of genital union. But the common good of friends who are not and cannot be
married (for example, man and man, man and boy, woman and
woman) has nothing to do with their having children by each other, and their reproductive organs cannot make them a biological
(and therefore personal) unit.4 6 So their sexual acts together cannot do what they may hope and imagine. Because their activation
of one or even each of their reproductive organs cannot be an
actualizing and experiencing of the marital good-as marital intercourse (intercourse between spouses in a marital way) can, even
between spouses who happen to be sterile-it can do no more than
provide each partner with an individual gratification. For want of a
common good that could be actualized and experienced by and in
this bodily union, that conduct involves the partners in treating
their bodies as instruments to be used in the service of their con-

46 Steven Macedo,
writes:

The New Natural Lawyers, THE HARV. CRIMSON,

Oct. 28,

1993,

In effect, gays can have sex in a way that is open to procreation, and to new
life. They can be, and many are, prepared to engage in the kind of loving relations that would result in procreation-were conditions different. Like sterile
married couples, many would like nothing better.
Here, fantasy has taken leave of reality. Anal or oral intercourse, whether between spouses or between males, is no more a biological union "open to procreation" than is intercourse with a goat by a shepherd who fantasizes about breeding a faun; each "would"
yield the desired mutant "were conditions different". Biological union between humans is
the inseminatory union of male genital organ with female genital organ; in most circumstances it does not result in generation, but it is the behavior that unites biologically
because it is the behavior which, as behavior, is suitable for generation.
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sciously experiencing selves; their choice to engage in such con47
duct thus dis-integrates each of them precisely as acting persons.
Reality is known in judgment, not in emotion, and in reality,
whatever the generous hopes and dreams and thoughts of giving
with which some same-sex partners may surround their sexual acts,
those acts cannot express or do more than is expressed or done if
two strangers engage in such activity to give each other pleasure,
or a prostitute pleasures a client to give him pleasure in return
for money, or (say) a man masturbates to give himself pleasure
and a fantasy of more human relationships after a gruelling day
on the assembly line. This is, I believe, the substance of Plato's
judgment-at that moment in the Gorgias which is also decisive for
the moral and political philosophical critique of hedonism 4 8 -that
there is no important distinction in essential moral worthlessness
between solitary masturbation, being sodomized as a prostitute,
and being sodomized for the pleasure of it. Sexual acts cannot in
reality be self-giving unless they are acts by which a man and a
woman actualize and experience sexually the real giving of themselves to each other-in biological, affective and volitional union
in mutual commitment, both open-ended and exclusive-which
like Plato and Aristotle and most peoples we call marriage.
In short, sexual acts are not unitive in their significance unless they are marital (actualizing the all-level unity of marriage)
and (since the common good of marriage has two aspects) they
are not marital unless they have not only the generosity of acts of
friendship but also the procreative significance, not necessarily of
being intended to generate or capable in the circumstances of
generating but at least of being, as human conduct, acts of the
reproductive kind-actualizations, so far as the spouses then and
there can, of the reproductive function in which they are biologically and thus personally one.
The ancient philosophers do not much discuss the case of
sterile marriages, or the fact (well known to them) that for long
periods of time (e.g. throughout pregnancy) the sexual acts of a
married couple are naturally incapable of resulting in reproduction. They appear to take for granted what the subsequent Christian tradition certainly did, that such sterility does not render the
conjugal sexual acts of the spouses non-marital. (Plutarch indicates
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For the whole argument, see GRISEZ, supra note 35, at 634-39, 648-54, 662-4.
PLATO, GORGIAS 494-5, especially 494ei-5, 495b3.
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that intercourse with a sterile spouse is a desirable mark of marital
esteem and affection.)49 For: A husband and wife who unite their
reproductive organs in an act of sexual intercourse which, so far
as they then can make it, is of a kind suitable for generation, do
function as a biological (and thus personal) unit and thus can be
actualizing and experiencing the two-in-one-flesh common good
and reality of marriage, even when some biological condition
happens to prevent that unity resulting in generation of a child.
Their conduct thus differs radically from the acts of a husband
and wife whose intercourse is masturbatory, for example sodomitic
or by fellatio or coitus interruptus. ° In law such acts do not consummate a marriage, because in reality (whatever the couple's illusions of intimacy and self-giving in such acts) they do not actualize
the one-flesh, two-part marital good.
Does this account seek to "make moral judgments based on
natural facts"?5 Yes and no. No, in the sense that it does not
seek to infer normative conclusions or theses from non-normative
(natural-fact) premises. Nor does it appeal to any norm of the
form "Respect natural facts or natural functions." But yes, it does

49 PLUTARCH, LIFE OF SOLON, 20,3. The post-Christian moral philosophy of Kant
identified the wrongfulness of masturbation and homosexual (and bestial) conduct as
consisting in the instrumentalisation of one's body, and thus ("since a person is an absolute unity") the "wrong to humanity in our own person." But Kant, though he emphasizes the equality of husband and wife (impossible in concubinage or more casual prostitution), did not integrate this insight with an understanding of marriage as a single
two-part good involving, inseparably, friendship as well as procreation. Hence he was
puzzled by the question why marital intercourse is right when the woman is pregnant or
beyond the menopause. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 277-79, 424-26
(Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991, 96-97, 220-22) (1797). The deep source
of his puzzlement is his refusal to allow intelligible goods any structural role in his ethics,
a refusal which sets him against a classical moral philosophy such as Aristotle's, and
indeed against any adequate theory of natural law, and in turn is connected with his
dualistic separation of body from mind and body, a separation which conflicts with his
own insight, just quoted, that the person is a real unity.
50 Or deliberately contracepted, which I omit from the list in the text only because
it would no doubt not now be accepted by secular civil law as preventing consummation-a failure of understanding. See discussion, supra note 46.
51 Macedo, supra note 46, at 2:
All we can
the case of
result from
theory does

say is that conditions would have to be more radically different in
gay and lesbian couples than sterile manied couples for new life to
sex . . . but what is the moral force of that: The new natural law
not make moral judgments based on natural facts.

Macedo's phrase "based on" equivocates between the first premises of normative arguments (which must be normative) and the other premise(s) (which can and normally
should be factual and, where appropriate, can refer to natural facts such as that the
human mouth is not a reproductive organ).
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apply the relevant practical reasons (especially that marriage and
inner integrity are basic human goods) and moral principles (especially that one may never intend to destroy, damage, impede, or
violate any basic human good, or prefer an illusory instantiation of
a basic human good to a real instantiation of that or some other
human good) to facts about the human personal organism.
VI.
Societies such as classical Athens and contemporary England
(and virtually every other) draw a distinction between behavior
found merely (perhaps extremely) offensive (such as eating excrement), and behavior to be repudiated as destructive of human
character and relationships. Copulation of humans with animals is
repudiated because it treats human sexual activity and satisfaction
as something appropriately sought in a manner as divorced from
the actualizing of an intelligible common good as is the instinctive
coupling of beasts-and so treats human bodily life, in one of its
most intense activities, as appropriately lived as merely animal. The
deliberate genital coupling of persons of the same sex is repudiated for a very similar reason. It is not simply that it is sterile and
disposes the participants to an abdication of responsibility for the
future of humankind. Nor is it simply that it cannot really actualize
the mutual devotion which some homosexual persons hope to
manifest and experience by it, and that it harms the personalities
of its participants by its dis-integrative manipulation of different
parts of their one personal reality. It is also that it treats human
sexual capacities in a way which is deeply hostile to the
self-understanding of those members of the community who are
willing to commit themselves to real marriage in the understanding that its sexual joys are not mere instruments or accompaniments to, or mere compensations for, the accomplishment of
marriage's responsibilities, but rather enable the spouses to actualize and experience their intelligent commitment to share in those
responsibilities, in that genuine self-giving.
Now, as I have said before, "homosexual orientation," in one
of the two main senses of that highly equivocal term, is-precisely
the deliberate willingness to promote and engage in homosexual
acts-the 'state
of mind, will,
and
character
whose
self-interpretation came to be expressed in the deplorable but
helpfully revealing name "gay." So this willingness, and the whole
"gay" ideology, treats human sexual capacities in a way which is
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deeply hostile to the self-understanding of those members of the
community who are willing to commit themselves to real marriage.
Homosexual orientation in this sense is, in fact, a standing
denial of the intrinsic aptness of sexual intercourse to actualize
and in that sense give expression to the exclusiveness and
open-ended commitment of marriage as something good in itself.
All who accept that homosexual acts can be a humanly appropriate use of sexual capacities must, if consistent, regard sexual capacities, organs and acts as instruments for gratifying the individual "selves" who have them. Such an acceptance is commonly (and
in my opinion rightly) judged to be an active threat to the stability of existing and future marriages; it makes nonsense, for example, of the view that adultery is per se (and not merely because it
may involve deception), and in an important way, inconsistent with
conjugal love. A political community which judges that the stability
and protective and educative generosity of family life is of fundamental importance to that community's present and future can
rightly judge that it has a compelling interest in denying that homosexual conduct-a "gay lifestyle"-is a valid, humanly acceptable
choice and form of life, and in doing whatever it properly can, as a
community with uniquely wide but still subsidiary functions, to discourage such conduct.
VII.
I promised to defend the judgment that the government of
political communities is subsidiary, and rationally limited not only
by constitutional law and by the moral norms which limit every
decent person's deliberation and choice, but also by the inherent
limits of its general justifying aim, purpose or rationale. That rationale is, of course, the common good of the political community.
And that common good, I shall argue, is not basic, intrinsic or
constitutive, but rather is instrumental.
Every community is constituted by the communication and
cooperation between its members. To say that a community has a
common good is simply to say that communication and cooperation have a point which the members more or less concur in
understanding, valuing and pursuing. There are three types of
common good which each provide the constitutive point of a
distinctive type of open-ended community and directly instantiate a
basic human good: (1) the affectionate mutual help and shared
enjoyment of the friendship and communio of "real friends"; (2)
the sharing of husband and wife in married life, united as comple-
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mentary, bodily persons whose activities make them apt for parenthood-the communio of spouses and, if their 'marriage is fruitful,
their children; (3) the communio of religious believers cooperating
in the devotion and service called for by what they believe to be
the accessible truths about the ultimate source of meaning, value
and other realities, and about the ways in which human beings
can be in harmony with that ultimate source. Other human communities either are dedicated to accomplishing a specific goal or
set of goals (like a university or hospital) and so are not in the
open-ended service of their members, or have a common good
which is instrumental rather than basic. One should notice here
that association and cooperation, even when oriented towards
goals which are both specific and instrumentally rather than basically and intrinsically good (as, e.g., in a business enterprise), have
a more than merely instrumental character inasmuch as they
instantiate the basic good of friendship in one or other of its central or non-central forms.
The political community-properly understood as one of theforms of collaboration needed for the sake of the basic goods
identified in the first principles of natural law-is a community
cooperating in the service of a common good which is instrumental, not itself basic. True, it is a good which is "great and godlike"52 in its ambitious range: "to secure the whole ensemble of
material and other conditions, including forms of collaboration,
that tend to favor, facilitate, and foster the realization by each
individual [in that community] of his or her personal development"53 (which will in each case include, constitutively, the flourishing of the family, friendship and other communities to which
that person belongs). True too, its proper range includes the
regulation of friendships, marriage, families, and religious associations, as well as of all the many organizations and associations
which are dedicated to specific goals or which, like the state itself,
have only an instrumental (e.g. an economic) common good. But
such regulation of these associations should never (in the case of
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ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 1,1: 1094b9.
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 147 (1980). As I indicate, this

account of the common good of the political- community is close to that worked out by
French commentators on Aquinas in the early mid-twentieth century. Id. at 160. A similar
account was adopted by the Second Vatican Council: "the sum of those conditions of
social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and
ready access to their own fulfillment." GAUDIUM ET SPES 1 26 (1965); see also DIGNITATIS
HUMANAE
6 (1965).
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the associations with a non-instrumental common good) or only
exceptionally (in the case of instrumental associations) be intended to take over the formation, direction or management of these
personal initiatives and interpersonal associations. Rather, its purpose must be to carry out the subsidiary (i.e. helping, from the
Latin subsidium, help) function54 of assisting individuals and
groups to coordinate their activities for the objectives and commitments they have chosen, and to do so in ways consistent with the
other aspects of the common good of this community, uniquely
complex, far-reaching and demanding in its rationale, its requirements of cooperation, and its monopolization of force: the political community.5
The fundamentally instrumental character of the political
common good is indicated by both parts of the Second Vatican
Council's teaching about religious liberty, a teaching considered by
the Council to be a matter of natural law (i.e. of "reason itself")6 The first part of the teaching is that everyone has the
right not to be coerced in matters of religious belief and practice.
For, to know the truth about the ultimate matters compendiously
called by the Council "religious," and to adhere to and put into
practice the truth one has come to know, is so significant a good
and so basic a responsibility, and the attainment of that "good of
the human spirit"5 7 is so inherently and non-substitutably a matter
of personal assent and conscientious decision, that if a government
intervenes coercively in people's search for true religious beliefs,
or in people's expression of the beliefs they suppose true, it will
harm those people and violate their dignity even when its inter-

54 See FINNIS, supra note 53, at 146-47, 159.
55 Of course, the common good of the political community has important elements
which are scarcely shared with any other community within the polity. for example, the
restoration of justice by punishment of those who have offended against just laws; the
coercive repelling and restraint of those whose conduct- (including negligent omissions)
unfairly threatens the interests of others, particularly those interests identified as moral
("human") or legal rights, and corresponding compulsory measures to secure restitution,
compensation or reparation for violations of rights; and the specifying and upholding of
a system of holding or property rights which respects the various interests, immediate
and vested or remote and contingent, which everyone has in each holding. But the fact
that these and various other elements of the political common good are peculiar to the
political community and the proper responsibility of its leaders, the government, in no
way entails that these elements are basic human goods or that the political common
good is other than in itself instrumental.
56 DIGNITATIS HuMANAE 1 2. In the succeeding part, the Declaration treats the matter as one of divine revelation. Id. at 11 9-14.
57 It is one of the animi humani bona mentioned in id., 1 1.

1994]

LAW, MORALITY, AND "SEXUAL ORIENTATION"

1073

vention is based on the correct premise that their search has been
negligently conducted and/or has led them into false beliefs. Religious acts, according to the Council, "transcend" the sphere which
is proper to government; government is to care for the temporal
common good, and this includes [the subsidiary function of] acknowledging and fostering the religious life of its citizens; but
governments have no responsibility or right to direct religious acts,
and "exceed their proper limit?' if they presume to do so.58
The second part of the Council's teaching concerns the proper
restrictions on religious freedom, namely those restrictions which
are
required for [i] the effective protection of the rights of all citizens
and of their peaceful coexistence, [ii] a sufficient care for the
authentic public peace of an ordered common life in true justice, and [iii] a proper upholding of public morality. All these
factors constitute the fundamental part of the common good,
and come under the notion of ordre public.59
Here, too, the political common good is presented as instrumental, serving the protection of human and legal rights, public
peace and public morality-in other words, the preservation of a
social environment conducive to virtue. Government is precisely
not presented here as dedicated to the commanding of virtue and
the repressing of vice, as such, even though virtue (and vice) are
of supreme and constitutive importance for the well-being (or
otherwise) of individual persons and the worth (or otherwise) of
their associations.
Is the Council's natural law teaching right? Or should we
rather adhere to the uncomplicated theory of Aquinas's treatise
On Princely Government, that government should command whatever
leads people towards their ultimate (heavenly) end, forbid whatever deflects them from it, and coercively deter people from
evil-doing and induce them to morally decent conduct?' Perhaps

58 "Potestas igitur civilis, cuilus finis proprius est bonum commune temporale curare,
religiosam quidem civium vitam agnoscere eique favere debet, sed limites suos excedere
dicenda est, si actus religiosos dirigere vel impedire praesumat." Id. at 1 3.
59 Id. at 1 7.
60 DE REGIMINE PRINCIPUM c.14 ( . . . ab iniquitate coerceat et ad opera virtuosa
inducat). This thesis is qualified, though not abandoned, in other works of Aquinas. Thus
Summa Theologiae I-I q.104 a.5c teaches that human government has no authority over
96
a.2 teaches that govpeople's minds and the interior motions of their wills. Id. I-I q.
ernmental pursuit of virtue should be gradual and should not ask too much of the average citizen (who is not virtuous).
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the most suasive short statement of that teaching is still Aristotle's
famous attack on theories which, like the sophist Lycophron's,
treat the state as a mere mutual insurance arrangement?6' But in
two crucial respects, at least, Aristotle (and with him the tradition)
has taken things too easily.
First If the object, point .or common good of the political
community were indeed a self-sufficient life, and if self-sufficiency
(autarcheia) were indeed what Aristotle defines it to be-a life
lacking in nothing, of complete fulfillment 6 2-- then we would
have to say that the political community has a point it cannot
hope to achieve, a common good utterly beyond its reach. For
subsequent philosophical reflection has confirmed what one might
suspect from Aristotle's own manifest oscillation between different
conceptions of eudaimonia (and thus of autarcheia): Integral human
fulfillment is nothing less than the fulfillment of (in principle) all
human persons in all communities and cannot be achieved in any
community short of the heavenly kingdom, a community envisaged
not by unaided reason (natural law theory) but only by virtue of
divine revelation and attainable only by a divine gift which transcends the capacities of nature. To be sure, integral human fulfillment can and should be a conception central to a natural law
theory of morality and thus of politics, and should be envisaged as
a kind of ideal community (to which will answer the reality of the
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It states:

[T]he polis was formed not for the sake of life only but rather for the good
life . . . and . . . its purpose is not [merely]

military alliance for defence ...

and it does not exist [merely] for the sake of trade and business relations . . .
any polls which is truly so called, and is not one merely in name, must have virtue/excellence as an object of its care [peri aretes epimeles eina be solicitous
about virtue]. Otherwise a polis sinks into a mere alliance, differing only, in
space from other forms of alliance where the members live at a distance from
each other. Otherwise, too, the law becomes a mere social contract [syntheke
covenant]--or (in the phrase of the sophist Lycophron) 'a guarantor of justice
las between one man and another'-instead of being, as it should be, such as
will make [poiein] the citizens good and just . . . The polis is not merely a
sharing of a common locality for the purpose of preventing mutual injury and
exchanging goods. These are necessary preconditions of the existence of a polis
. but a polis is a communio [koinonia] of clans [and neighborhoods] in living
well, with the object of a full and self-sufficient [autarkous] life . . . it must
therefore be for the sake of truly good (kalon) actions, not of merely living together."
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 111.5: 1280a32, a35, 1280b7-13, b30-31, b34, 1281al-4.
62 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, I, 7:1097b8. This, incidentally, differs widely
from what STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 215-17 (1990), means by "an autarchic
person."
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Kingdom which Christian faith's first moral norm directs us to
seek).6 But that ideal community is not, as early natural law theories such as Aristotle's prematurely proposed, the political community.
Second: When Aristotle speaks of "making" people good, he
constantly' uses the word poiesis which he has so often contrasted
with praxis and reserved for techniques ("arts") of manipulating
matter.' But helping citizens to choose and act in line with integral human fulfillment must involve something which goes beyond
any art or technique. For only individual acting persoris can by
their own choices make themselves good or evil. Not that their life
should or can be individualistic; their deliberating and choosing
will be shaped, and helped or hindered, by the language of their
culture, by their family, their fiends, their associates and enemies,
the customs of their communities, the laws of their polity, and by
the impress of human influences of many kinds from beyond their
homeland. Their choices will involve them in relationships just or
unjust, generous or illiberal, vengeful or charitable, with other
persons in all these communities. And as members of all these
communities they have some responsibility to encourage their
fellow-members in morally good and discourage them from morally bad conduct.
To be sure, the political community is a cooperation which
undertakes the unique tasks of giving coercive protection to all
individuals and lawful associations within its domain, and of securing an economic and cultural environment in which all these
persons and groups can pursue their own proper good. To be
sure, this common good of the political community makes it far
more than a mere arrangement for "preventing mutual injury and

63 For nothing less than integral human fulfillment, the fulfillment of all persons in
all the basic human goods, answers to reason's full knowledge of, and the will's full
interest in, the human good in which one can participate by action. And so the first
principle of a sound morality must be: In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and will those and only those possibilities -whose willing is compatible with integral human fulfillment. To say that 'immorality is constituted by cutting back on, fettering, reason by passions is equivalent' to saying that the sway of feelings over reason constitutes immorality by deflecting one to objectives not in line with integral human fulfillment. This ideal community is thus the
good will's most fundamental orientating ideal.
64 Apart from the passage just cited, see ARISTOTLE, NiCOIACHFAN ETHICS, I, 10;
1099b32; II, 1: 110364; X, 9: 1180b24.
65 E.g. ARISToTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcS, VI, 5: 1140a2; ARiSToTLE, POLITICS, 1, 2:
1254a5.
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exchanging goods." But it is one thing to maintain, as reason
requires, that the political community's rationale requires that its
public managing structure, the state, should deliberately and publicly identify, encourage, facilitate and support the truly worthwhile
(including moral virtue), should deliberately and publicly identify,
discourage and hinder the harmful and evil, and should, by its
criminal prohibitions and sanctions (as well as its other laws and
policies), assist people with parental responsibilities to educate
children and young people in virtue and to discourage their vices.
It is another thing to maintain that that rationale requires or
authorizes the state to direct people to virtue and deter them
from vice by making even secret and truly consensual adult acts of
vice a punishable offence against the state's laws.'
So there was a sound and important distinction of principle
which the Supreme Court of the United States overlooked in moving from Griswold v. Connecticu 7 (private use of contraceptives by
spouses) to Eisenstadt v. Baird (public distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried people).' The truth and relevance of that distinction,
and its high importance for the common good, would be overlooked again if laws criminalizing private acts of sodomy between
adults were to be struck down by the Court on any ground which
would also constitutionally require the law to tolerate the advertising or marketing of homosexual services, the maintenance of
places of resort for homosexual activity, or the promotion of
homosexualist "lifestyles" via education and public media of communication, or to recognize homosexual "marriages" or permit the
adoption of children by homosexually active people, and so forth.

66 So a third way in which Aristotle takes things too easily is his slide from upholding government's responsibility to assist or substitute for the direct parental discipline of
youth, to claiming that this responsibility continues, and in the same direct coercive
form, "to cover the whole of a lifetime, since most people obey necessity rather than
argument, and punishments rather than the sense of what is truly worthwhile." ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, X.9:1180al-3.

67 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
68 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The law struck down in Griswold was the law forbidding use
of contraceptives even by married persons; Griswold's conviction as an accessory to such
use fell with the fall of the substantive law against the principals in such use. Very different, in principle, would have been a law directly forbidding Griswold's activities as a
public promoter of contraceptive information and supplies. If American constitutional law
fails to recognize such distinctions, it shows, I suggest, its want of sound principle.

